In the latter half of the twentieth century, developed countries of the world have made tremendous strides in organ donation and transplantation. However, in this area of medicine, Japan has been slow to follow. Japanese ethics, deeply rooted in religion and tradition, have affected their outlook on life and death. Because the Japanese have only recently started to acknowledge the concept of brain death, transplantation of major organs has been hindered in that country. Currently, there is a dual definition of (...) death in Japan, intended to satisfy both sides of the issue. This interesting paradox, which still stands to be fully resolved, illustrates the contentious conflict between medical ethics and medical progress in Japan. (shrink)

Across four studies, we explored how feeling nostalgic about an attitude object impacts the metacognitive characteristics of the attitude toward that object and how those metacognitions predict the evaluation’s underlying strength. In each study, participants reflected on and evaluated a song or television show that either did or did not elicit nostalgia. Across these studies, we found support for the hypotheses that nostalgic attitude objects are viewed more positively, appraised with greater attitudinal importance, and exhibited less objective ambivalence. In Study (...) 4, we observed that nostalgic attitudes are associated with greater behavioural intentions and that this relationship was mediated both by attitudinal importance and objective ambivalence. These studies contribute to our understanding of how nostalgia affects attitude formation processes. (shrink)

Truth and realism have effectively disappeared as critical standards in American television criticism. McConnell researched writings in this area to find what little has been said about truth and realism since 1983. He theorizes that a closed ideological hegemony that is American television makes objective truth uncomfortable, leading to disappearance of truth and realism as a critical standard.

Cornelius Lanczos is professor emeritus at the Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies. Hungarian-born he made significant contributions to the development of relativity and quantum theory in the earlier decades of this century, and during the past twenty years he has established himself as an authority on numerical analysis. In addition he has a deep appreciation of literature from the Old Testament onwards, of music and of the arts. His writings in recent years have consisted largely in philosophical speculations on aspects (...) of physics. The present book is an historical account of man’s investigation of the nature and properties of space. Lanczos’ gift of clear exposition and his broad culture have made it a readable and valuable review of the development of the notion of space throughout the ages. (shrink)

Rossbank functioned from 1840 to 1854 as one of a chain of British Colonial Observatories which combined with European and Asian observatories in the study of terrestrial magnetism. It was established in Hobart, Tasmania, by the Governor of Van Diemen's Land, Sir John Franklin, and Captain James Clark Ross, R.N., commanding H.M. ships Erebus and Terror. The history and operation of the Rossbank Observatory is related, its instruments described, and the results discussed.Biographical notes on the Observatory staff, with lists of (...) its archives and instruments are provided. A number of previously unpublished pictures show the Observatory in use and the surviving buildings and instruments today. (shrink)

Utilitarianism has recently been criticised on two counts in a recent number of Ratio. According to Terrance C. McConnell, it represents many of the acts which are ordinarily regarded as supererogatory as obligatory, and some of the others as actually wrong. In support of the latter criticism, he gives two kinds of examples: cases of self-sacrifice, and cases of trivial favours. Acts of self-sacrifice performed for the sake of others’ good, but which result in a greater balance of harm (...) over benefits than alternative acts would produce, would, he claims, normally be regarded as heroic, but are forbidden as wrong by the utilitarian: and of two alternative trivial favours, either of which would ordinarily count as supererogatory the utilitarian must treat the more beneficial as an obligation, and the less beneficial alternative as unallowable. These departures from ordinary responses are considered grounds for seriously doubting the adequacy of utilitarianism. (shrink)

Utilitarianism has recently been criticised on two counts in a recent number of Ratio. According to Terrance C. McConnell, it represents many of the acts which are ordinarily regarded as supererogatory as obligatory, and some of the others as actually wrong. In support of the latter criticism, he gives two kinds of examples: cases of self-sacrifice, and cases of trivial favours. Acts of self-sacrifice performed for the sake of others’ good, but which result in a greater balance of harm (...) over benefits than alternative acts would produce, would, he claims, normally be regarded as heroic, but are forbidden as wrong by the utilitarian: and of two alternative trivial favours, either of which would ordinarily count as supererogatory the utilitarian must treat the more beneficial as an obligation, and the less beneficial alternative as unallowable. These departures from ordinary responses are considered grounds for seriously doubting the adequacy of utilitarianism. (shrink)

There are important similarities between moral thought and talk and thought and talk about gender: disagreements about gender, like disagreements about morality, seem to be intractable and to outstrip descriptive agreement; and it seems coherent to reject any definition of what it is to be a woman in terms of particular social, biological, or other descriptive features, just as it seems coherent to reject any definition of what it is to be good or right in terms of any set of (...) descriptive properties. These similarities give us reason to investigate the idea that, like moral thought and talk, gender thought and talk is inherently normative. This paper proposes a normative account of gender thought and talk in terms of fitting treatment. On this fitting treatment account, to judge that A is gender G is just to judge that it is fitting to treat A as a G. This account is a descriptive or hermeneutical account of our gender thought and talk rather than an ameliorative account of our gender concepts or a metaphysical account of gender properties in social metaphysics. This paper argues that other descriptive accounts of gender thought and talk face problems that the fitting treatment account overcomes. (shrink)

Epistemic decision theorists aim to justify Bayesian norms by arguing that these norms further the goal of epistemic accuracy—having beliefs that are as close as possible to the truth. The standard defense of Probabilism appeals to accuracy dominance: for every belief state that violates the probability calculus, there is some probabilistic belief state that is more accurate, come what may. The standard defense of Conditionalization, on the other hand, appeals to expected accuracy: before the evidence is in, one should expect (...) to do better by conditionalizing than by following any other rule. We present a new argument for Conditionalization that appeals to accuracy‐dominance, rather than expected accuracy. Our argument suggests that Conditionalization is a rule of coherence: plans that conflict with Conditionalization don't just prescribe bad responses to the evidence; they also give rise to inconsistent attitudes. (shrink)

A popular argument is that peer disagreement about controversial moral topics undermines justified moral belief in a way that peer disagreement about non-moral topics does not undermine justified non-moral belief. Call this argument the argument for moral skepticism from peer disagreement. Jason Decker and Daniel Groll have recently made a companions in guilt response to this argument. Decker and Groll argue that if peer disagreement undermines justified moral belief, then peer disagreement undermines much non-moral justified belief; if the argument for (...) moral skepticism from peer disagreement succeeds, then a kind of non-moral skepticism holds too. And we should not hold that the status of such non-moral beliefs are undermined by peer disagreement. In this paper, I shows that Decker and Groll’s companions in guilt argument fails. I then draw out the implications of my argument for the epistemology of disagreement and the epistemology of moral disagreement more generally. For instance, I then argue that peer disagreement about morality does not undermine all justified moral belief but that peer disagreement about morality does preclude most moral beliefs from being justified and constituting knowledge in a way that peer disagreement about non-moral topics does not preclude most non-moral beliefs from being justified and constituting knowledge. (shrink)

In this article, we consider two independently appealing theories—the Growing-Block view and Humean Supervenience—and argue that at least one is false. The Growing-Block view is a theory about the nature of time. It says that past and present things exist, while future things do not, and the passage of time consists in new things coming into existence. Humean Supervenience is a theory about the nature of entities like laws, nomological possibility, counterfactuals, dispositions, causation, and chance. It says that none of (...) these entities are fundamental, since if they were, this would entail the existence of irreducible necessary connections between matters of fact. Instead, these entities supervene on a fundamental, non-nomological ‘Humean mosaic’ of property instances at spacetime points. We will further explain and motivate the Growing-Block view and Humean Supervenience in Sects. 2 and 3, but first, we turn to our master argument. (shrink)

I am interested in extending modal calculi by adding propositional quantifiers, given by the rules for quantifier introduction: provided that p does not occur free in A.

The author's motivation for constructing the calculi of this paper\nis so that time and tense can be "discussed together in the same\nlanguage" (p. 282). Two types of enriched propositional caluli for\ntense logic are considered, both containing ordinary propositional\nvariables for which any proposition may be substituted. One type\nalso contains "clock-propositional" variables, a,b,c, etc., for\nwhich only clock-propositional variables may be substituted and that\ncorrespond to instants or moments in the semantics. The other type\nalso contains "history-propositional" variables, u,v,w, etc., for\nwhich only history-propositional variables may (...) be substituted and\nthat correspond to maximally linearly ordered subsets of instants.\nThis second type is for tense logics in which time is not linear\nand where at any moment there may exist alternative future courses\nof events. Quantifiers are included in both types but only for clock-\nand history-propositional variables. However, these quantifiers are\ngiven an essentially substitutional interpretation. In addition,\nbesides each clock-propositional variable being true at exactly one\ninstant, the semantics requires that for each instant there be at\nleast one clock-propositional variable true at that instant, which\nin effect amounts to having each instant of the model "denoted" in\nthe formalism by some clock-propositional variable. Thus it is not\nsurprising that quantification over clock-propositional variables\nturns out to have a "well behaved first-order semantics" (p. 284).\n{One axiom relating history- with clock-propositions seems to need\nrevision: CKTauTbuAUabUba. Since the clock-propositional variables\nmight be true at the same instant the consequent should include an\nalternative, namely, LCab.} Besides the standard truth-functional\nand tense operators G,H,F,P, the author includes L for "it is\nalways the case that". The model-theoretic earlier-than relation\nordering instants and the semantic truth-at (an instant) relation\nare formalized by Uab and Taα (for a wff α) which\nare defined respectively as LCbPa (whenever the clock-proposition\nb is the case the clock-proposition a was the case) and LCaα\n(α is the case whenever the clock-proposition a is the case).\nBecause the future tense operators are definable in terms of U\nand T and the latter are definable in terms of L and P, the\ndual of H, the author notes that his completeness proofs can be\nrestricted to L and H as primitive and with the future tense\noperators used for other interpretations, especially Prior, A.'s\nindeterminist "it will be the case that", where time is not linear.\nThe author concludes with some rather technical observations showing\nthat "in ordinary tense logics the instants are nonstandard elements\nof the models. This provides", according to the author, "a semantic\npressure to build the instants into tense logic, so that they will\nappear as standard elements in the models" (p. 283). (shrink)

We show that five important elements of the ‘nomological package’— laws, counterfactuals, chances, dispositions, and counterfactuals—needn’t be a problem for the Growing-Block view. We begin with the framework given in Briggs and Forbes (in The real truth about the unreal future. Oxford studies in metaphysics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012 ), and, taking laws as primitive, we show that the Growing-Block view has the resources to provide an account of possibility, and a natural semantics for non-backtracking causal counterfactuals. We show (...) how objective chances might ground a more fine-grained concept of feasibility, and furnished a places in the structure where causation and dispositions might fit. The Growing-Block view, thus understood, provides the resources to explain the close link between modality and tense, so that it predicts modal change as time passes. This account lets us capture not only what the future might hold for us, and also what might have been. (shrink)

Sociological and philosophical analysis of the role of will power upon the moral development of individuals.

This book is an attack on the widespread assumption that the mind has parts and that it is the interaction between these parts which accounts for the irrational behaviour displayed un self- deception and weakness of will.

In the early 1950s Grant McConnell, Jr., called for a political adjudication of our environmental and political visions. He pointed out the arbitrary nature of Gifford Pinchot's noble-sounding formula (“The greatest good for the greatest number over the longest time”), noting that such a determination depended on whom you asked. No technocrat can determine the greatest good on the basis of some secret expertise or privileged knowledge. We need to resolve our disparate visions of the uses of nature and (...) human beings politically, without recourse to privileged knowledge.But does such a political adjudication imply the unimpeded domination of the will of the majority? Not necessarily, because there is no overall majority for a total “bundle” of policies and programs — these must be horse-traded and haggled over on the basis of shifting coalitions. Yet, can it not be argued that even so, some very deeply held values of minorities will be trounced and trampled? It would be dishonest not to admit to such a danger. What we must do is try to define and develop a workable conception of baseline human rights that will be inviolable by the will of temporary majorities, and this itself is a tenuous political process which we have only just embarked on in recent times.The danger of Valentin Rasputins, Vernadskii cultists, and Deep Ecologists everywhere is that they are arguing from privileged knowledge. “We know what is really best for you, what will cure you,” they assert. They alone know the distinction between natural harmony and disorder, social health and corruption, pollution and purity, alienation and unity. They do not recognize the social construction of their ethical beliefs and political visions; they absolutize their individual truths. They may be right, but what if they are not...?It is therefore all the more important for those of us who wish to preserve a maximum of biotic and human diversity for our-selves and for future humans (and nonhumans) to be explicit about the moral and political agendas we embrace. The soundest way for us to prevail is to persuade our neighbors on this planet that our visions have something of value for them, too. We must keep in mind the fact that in a world where there exists more than one fanaticism, peaceful coexistence is in principle impossible.And if fanaticisms, including ecological ones, are the products of the fear or the fact of material, cultural, or spiritual dispossession, then we must work harder to make a world in which each of us and our interests are treated with equal respect. We cannot get there through the tainted means of absolutizing individual truths.Aldo Leopold, in his testament Sand County Almanac, as much as called for a new myth, for us to “think like a mountain.”57 He called for a new myth because he believed that humans were dangerous (to ourselves, first of all, and to the planet), and that inculcating a myth was the only way to effect a deep behavioral change on a massive enough scale to save the situation.58 It is my belief that myths are often more dangerous than the situations they seek to remedy. We need to cultivate a taste of de-mythologizing, of making our lives more self-aware. We need to become aware of our needs and our value preferences and to take responsibility for them as individual preferences. Then we will be in a good position indeed to respect and compromise with the preferences of our neighbors all around this planet, just as we would have them respect and compromise with ours. *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A8402064 00005 *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A8402064 00006 *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A8402064 00007. (shrink)

Aim To study the views of people in a largely Muslim country, Kuwait, of the acceptability of a life-ending action such as physician-assisted suicide (PAS). Method 330 Kuwaiti university students judged the acceptability of PAS in 36 scenarios composed of all combinations of four factors: the patient's age (35, 60 or 85 years); the level of incurability of the illness (completely incurable vs extremely difficult to cure); the type of suffering (extreme physical pain or complete dependence) and the extent to (...) which the patient requests a life-ending procedure, euthanasia or PAS (no request, some form of request, repeated requests). In all scenarios, the patients were women who were receiving the best possible care. The ratings were subjected to cluster analysis and analyses of variance. Results Five clusters were found. For 44%, PAS was always very unacceptable, no matter what the circumstances. For 23%, it was unacceptable, but less so if the patient was older or requested it repeatedly. For 16%, it was unacceptable if the patient was young but was acceptable if the patient was elderly. For 5%, it was unacceptable if the patient had extreme pain but was acceptable if completely dependent. For 11%, it was unacceptable if the patient did not request it but acceptable if she did. Conclusion The majority of the Kuwaiti university students opposed PAS either categorically or with a slight variation according to circumstances. Nonetheless, a minority approved of PAS in some cases, particularly when the patient was elderly. (shrink)

Part of the Studies in Crime and Public Policy series, this book, written by one of the top philosophers of punishment, examines the main trends in penal theorizing over the past three decades. Duff asks what can justify criminal punishment, and then explores the legitimacy of actual practices by examining what would count as adequate justification for them. Duff argues that a "communicative conception of punishment," which he presents as a third way between consequentialist and retributive theories, offers the most (...) fruitful way of understanding punishment's meaning and justification. Duff addresses such questions as how much sentences should be constrained by proportionality requirements; what modalities of punishment best communicate their intended meaning; and what decisionmaking procedures he envisions. This book will appeal to criminologists, philosophers, and others interested in theories of punishment. (shrink)

Gender discrimination and sexual harassment of female police officers by their male counterparts remain areas of liability where police departments appeared to have failed to effectively confront the nagging issues. However, the appreciable level of research conducted on these issues in the global North has not been matched by the South, where issues bordering on sexual violence have cultural underpinnings. Drawing from the case of the Nigeria Police Force, feminist analysis was used to explore the lived reality of 43 female (...) officers in a qualitative study. Participants expressed distress in abiding by structural discriminatory regulations against female officers which include non-admittance of married women into the force, forbidding unmarried officers from getting pregnant, and a stipulated minimum of three-year work period before a female officer can marry. Findings also indicated that participants suffer a variety of sexual harassment, intimidation, and, violence from their male colleagues, while they feel constrained in reporting their victimization. Important policy and practical implications requiring the Nigerian police to address hegemonic masculinity and promote gender equality were provided. (shrink)

Marcia Baron has offered an illuminating and fruitful discussion of extra-legal excuses. What is particularly useful, and particularly important, is her focus on our excusatory practices—on the ways and contexts in which we make, offer, accept, bestow and reject excuses: if we are to reach an adequate understanding of excuses, their implications and their grounds, we must attend to the roles that they can play in our human activities and relationships—and to the complexities and particularities of those roles. However, I (...) want to focus my comments less on the details of Baron’s discussions of excuses in extra-legal contexts than on the implications of her discussion for our understanding of excuses in the criminal law. What light (if any, a sceptic might add) can such analyses of our extra-legal concepts and practices throw on legal concepts and doctrines? (shrink)

In [1, §4], my ‘proof’ that GH1 has the finite model property is incorrect; there are considerable obscurities towards the end of §1, particularly on p. 33; and I should have exhibited the finite models for GH1. In §1 of this paper I expand the analysis of the sub-directly irreducible models for GH1 which I give in §1 of [1]. In §2 I give a correct proof that GH1 has the finite model property. In §3 I exhibit these finite models (...) as models on certain ordered sets. (shrink)